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one another and their state. Yet, here also 
lies the possibility for recovery over time, 
which does not proceed in a linear man-
ner, but as Robben notes, moves through 
cycles and oscillations that may never be 
fully resolved. By focusing on trust and 
betrayal in this way, Robben’s work can 
also offer insights into studies of other 
societies grappling with repressive states 
or the legacies of repression. Robben 
thus makes a significant contribution to 
Argentina’s human rights history, but also 
to the enduring value of anthropology 
and the social sciences to such studies. 
Fundamentally, this work reinforces what 
studies of violence can tell us about how 
we relate to one another as citizens and 
people, how we generate meaning, and 
at the core, what it means to be human.
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We became aware of the existence of a 
right to have rights (and that means to 
live in a framework where one is judged 
according to actions and opinions) and a 
right to belong to some kind of organized 
community, when there suddenly emerged 
millions of people who had lost and could 
not regain these rights because of the new 
global political situation.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins 
of Totalitarianism
Hannah Arendt first wrote the phrase “the 
right to have rights” in a publication in the 
1949 summer issue of Modern Review.1 
Many years prior to that publication, 
Arendt was a stateless refugee. Fleeing 
Hitler’s Germany, she sought refuge in 
France. Yet after the German occupation 
of France in 1940, Arendt once again had 
to flee, but appealing to US diplomats 
would not do her any good since the 
“State Department discouraged the issu-
ance of visas to any of the thousands of 
refugees fleeing the Nazis.”2 Luckily, as it 
turned out, Arendt eventually managed to 
become a naturalized US citizen in 1951. 
Reflecting on her struggle as a stateless 
refugee, Arendt’s phrase “the right to have 
rights” appeared again near the end of 
her book, The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
In the book, Arendt thought about the 
preconditions that are necessary for any 
civil, political, or social rights. If such 
rights were to exist, there first had to be 
  1. stePhAnie deGooyeR et Al., the RiGht to hAVe RiGhts 5 (2018).
  2. Id. at 1.
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a “right to have rights.”3 But what might 
it mean to claim a “right” to have rights? 
And what might Arendt have meant in 
coining this infamous phrase?
Many activists have treated the phrase 
as an “uncomplicated synonym for hu-
man rights.”4 On a first pass reading of 
the phrase, we might be inclined to take 
it as the assertion that behind all civil 
rights stands an inalienable moral right, 
one fundamental right that is pre-legal. 
Understood in this way, the singular right 
in the phrase was “born out of the realiza-
tion that in order to have rights, it seems 
that one must first have a right to be a 
member of a political community.”5 All 
well and good. But Arendt was skeptical 
of inalienable moral rights. So, the usage 
of the singular “right” in the phrase gave 
rise to a paradox for her: if one does 
not already belong to a right-conferring 
political community, then how can one 
assert the right to belong? Put differently, 
if you need to belong in order to assert 
any rights, then how can there be a 
“right to have rights”?6 In an attempt to 
clarify Arendt’s phrase, and the puzzles it 
raises, The Right to Have Rights presents 
us with an extended meditation on the 
phrase. Rather than solicit four separate 
analyses of the phrase, each chapter 
examines a piece of Arendt’s phrase: in 
Chapter 1, Stephanie DeGooyer exam-
ines the singular “right”; in Chapter 2, 
Lida Maxwell examines what it is “to 
have” rights; in Chapter 3, Samuel Moyn 
examines the plural “rights” contained in 
Arendt’s phrase; and finally, in Chapter 
4, Alastair Hunt asks us to consider the 
question that the phrase poses: who are 
the bearers of these rights?
In what follows I will briefly exam-
ine each chapter of the book (omitting 
commentary on the afterword), and then 
offer up a critique of what I take to be 
a shortcoming of the book, namely, its 
lack of engagement with natural rights 
theorists (and so-called Orthodox ac-
counts of human rights).
In the first chapter of the book Stepha-
nie DeGooyer attempts to complicate 
the popular understanding of Arendt’s 
phrase, understood as an “uncomplicated 
synonym for human rights.”7 DeGooyer 
asks if this reading “merely restate[s] and 
reinforce[s] the tautological relationship 
between citizen and universal rights that 
Arendt identifies in her critique of human 
rights?”8 Given Arendt’s skepticism of 
human rights, DeGooyer wonders how 
Arendt can “speak of a right for millions 
of stateless persons to belong to a po-
litical community without, at the same 
time, claiming a transcendental source 
for rights, precisely the kind of right she 
wearily critiqued in her analysis of human 
rights?”9 The puzzle, roughly put, then, 
is how we are to make sense of Arendt’s 
phrase—the right to have rights—since 
Arendt holds that grounding rights in 
human nature amounts to a “naïve or 
ideological avoidance of the difficult task 
of figuring out how to live together ac-
cording to rules of justice.” 10 In an effort 
to resolve the puzzle, DeGooyer seeks 
to carve out a hybrid position between 
the two dominant understandings of the 
phrase “the right to have rights”—one 
that is consistent with Arendt’s skepticism 
towards rights-talk.
In Chapter 2 we turn out attention 
to the “to have” in the phrase “the right 
  3. Id. at 2.
  4. Id. at 12.
  5. Id. at 13.
  6. Id. at 13.
  7. Id. at 12.
  8. Id. at 23.
  9. Id. at 25.
 10. Id. at 27.
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to have rights.” Lida Maxwell rightly 
points out that Arendt parts ways with 
an understanding common to the liberal 
tradition. Rather than being metaphysical 
properties that we can all recognize as 
self-evident, rights are, for Arendt, things 
that we participate in bringing into ex-
istence. As Maxwell writes, “‘to have’ 
rights means to participate in staging, 
creating, and sustaining, [. . .] a com-
mon political world where the ability 
to legitimately claim and demand rights 
becomes a possibility for everyone.”11 
And while Maxwell acknowledges that 
this understanding of what it means 
“to have” a right is founded on a more 
fragile base, its commitment to truth 
over “a dangerous myth” allows us to 
actually confront the present “reality of 
rightlessness.”12 Instead of lapsing into 
comforting and supposedly self-evident 
moral certitudes, Arendt’s critique of 
rights, Maxwell suggests, allows us to 
see the need of working towards making 
a world where everyone can, in practice 
rather than in theory, claim their rights.13
In Chapter 3, we move from the sin-
gular right to the plural “rights.” Here, 
Samuel Moyn aptly points out that Arendt 
could have called her basic right the right 
to be a citizen; “but she did not—she 
called it the right to have rights.”14 But 
Moyn wonders whether this framing was 
a mere accident given Arendt’s overall 
disdain for natural rights. If so, perhaps 
attempts to interpret Arendt’s phrase 
as the beginnings of a transcendental 
argument are misguided. Far from be-
ing concerned with the metaphysical 
conditions of possibility of claiming 
any plural rights, Arendt seemed more 
interested in understanding what rights 
are by looking at what they do. Rather 
than try to square the phrase with the 
rest of Arendt’s corpus, Moyn presents 
the refreshing possibility that perhaps 
we should understand Arendt’s phrase 
as an “incidental artifact” given that the 
phrase was at “crosspurposes with other 
tendencies in her outlook.”15 Perhaps it 
is not flattering to conclude that such a 
brilliant thinker as Hannah Arendt could 
write a five-word phrase that, despite gar-
nering so much attention, is inconsistent 
with the rest of her corpus. And yet, it 
seems accurate to observe that even the 
best minds among us contain multitudes; 
that they are writers of inconsistencies 
perhaps reveals their intellectual courage 
to struggle within a dialectic, rather than 
purporting to always stand outside it.
The final chapter of The Right to 
Have Rights asks of Arendt’s phrase: “of 
Whom?” That is, who are the individuals 
that hold this right? It is somewhat puz-
zling, Alastair Hunt writes, that Arendt’s 
phrase, in contrast to phrases like “the 
rights of man” or “women’s rights,” 
“doesn’t give the bearers themselves a 
name.”16 So who are the bearers? One 
obvious response is that they are humans. 
But Hunt, citing Arendt’s skepticism of 
so-called “human rights,” takes this lack 
of specificity in Arendt’s phrase as a clue 
to the meaning of the phrase. The point 
of Arendt’s phrase is to be understood, so 
Hunt argues, as a diagnostic tool for call-
ing into question our “assumptions about 
who counts as a subject of rights.”17 If it 
is true, as Arendt wrote in The Origins 
 11. Id. at 48.
 12. Id. at 58.
 13. Id. at 58.
 14. Id. at 59.
 15. Id. at 71.
 16. Id. at 75.
 17. Id. at 18.
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of Totalitarianism, that “Inborn human 
dignity . . . not only does not exist but is 
the last and possibly most arrogant myth 
we have invented,” then perhaps there 
is a live possibility that we might come 
to regard entities traditionally regarded 
as lacking dignity—non-human animals 
or the environment—as worthy of the 
inclusion in our discourse on rights.18 The 
open-endedness of Arendt’s phrase, then, 
presents us with a space in which we can 
finally begin to ask questions that have 
been previously thought to be settled.
The Right to Have Rights is a pithy 
book. In fewer than 120 pages, it man-
ages to illuminate both what Arendt might 
have intended in writing the phrase, and 
what we might glean from the phrase 
today. Drawing on a wide range of ex-
pertise—from disciplines such as English, 
History, Law, and Political Science—the 
book often emphasizes the value of arriv-
ing at rich interpretations of the phrase, 
rather than permanently closing the 
question of its meaning. Perhaps, then, 
the ultimate value of Arendt’s phrase, 
even if it does not neatly fit into the rest 
of her corpus, as Samuel Moyn suggests, 
is its capacity to provoke us to think 
about the 1 percent of humanity—the 
“65.3 million people” who are either 
“an asylum-seeker, internally displaced, 
or a refugee.”19
For all its merits, however, some of 
the arguments advanced in The Right to 
Have Rights, seem too hasty. For instance, 
DeGooyer refers to Selya Benhabib’s 
Kantian reading of Arendt’s phrase, which 
says that the singular right in the phrase is 
a moral right. That is, it is a pre-political 
and non-legal right “that tells us that we 
ought to have rights, such as a right to 
water or a right to health care, and that 
this right is universal for all human be-
ings.”20 So, according to Benhabib, even 
if a state did not recognize your rights 
against, say, being tortured, you would 
still have those rights in virtue of being 
human. Moral rights, roughly put, do not 
come into being when a state or law says 
so; on the contrary, their prior existence 
is the standard by which we often judge 
particular laws or states as being or act-
ing unjustly. And yet, despite Benhabib’s 
influence, DeGooyer takes issue with her 
view since it allegedly fails to take us 
“beyond Arendt’s paradox.”21
But this seems strange; for Benhabib’s 
view does take us out of Arendt’s para-
dox. Recall that Arendt’s paradox was 
how persons not already belonging to a 
political community can at once assert 
the right to belong. Benhabib’s solution 
is to say that the right to belong—to 
participate in civic life—is a moral right; 
hence, its existence does not depend 
on the recognition of others. Arguably, 
this is a virtue of Benhabib’s view (and 
many other scholars working from Kan-
tian and natural law traditions) since it 
can neatly explain why stateless persons 
have rights—and we have corresponding 
duties to respond to those rights—even if 
we fail to recognize those rights.
Of course, this is not to say that there 
are not any problems with the view for 
which Benhabib advocates. But it is 
strange that DeGooyer fails to engage 
critically with Benhabib’s view beyond 
asserting that Arendt has shown that ap-
pealing to the quality of being human is 
“incapable of generating any rights” and 
 18. Id. at 75.
 19. Id. at 104, cited in With 1 Human in Every 113 Affected, Forced Displacement Hits 
Record High, united nAtions hiGh CoMMissioneR foR RefuGees (UNHCR) (20 June 2016).
 20. deGooyeR et Al., supra note 1, at 24.
 21. Id. at 27.
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that such appeals are “naïve” or “ideo-
logical.”22 What we are left wondering 
is just what exactly Arendt’s argument 
is against this way of thinking of rights. 
Perhaps DeGooyer finds Benhabib’s way 
out of Arendt’s paradox unsatisfying, but 
an argument for why the reader should 
find it unsatisfying is merely asserted, 
rather than argued for.
Lida Maxwell also takes issue with 
the conception of rights advocated for 
by Benhabib: “While we tend to think of 
rights as natural possessions that adhere 
to us by virtue of our humanity, Arendt 
suggests that the conditions of stateless 
people reveal this common sense to be 
an illusion.”23 And while the rhetorical 
flare of terms like “illusions” and “myth” 
are frequently cited when critiquing 
proponents of natural rights, again, as 
was the case with DeGooyer’s critique of 
Benhabib, we find the same conflation 
of two distinct concepts, namely, 1) exis-
tence and 2) recognition. Let me explain.
The move seems to be as follows: 
Natural rights could not exist because 
we can cite cases in the past when per-
sons, institutions, or states have failed to 
recognize or engage in any meaningful 
political action when so-called natural 
rights were under threat. Here is the 
problem: while it is true that the failure 
to recognize the existence of a legal or 
social right entails that the right does not 
exist in a meaningful sense, it does not 
follow that failing to recognize the exis-
tence of a moral right entails that it does 
not exist in any meaningful sense. To as-
sert without argument that our collective 
failure to recognize the rights of stateless 
persons entails that they have no rights is 
to beg the question against the view that 
some rights—namely moral rights—don’t 
depend on being recognized to exist. Just 
as carbon emissions continue to grow 
year over year whether we recognize it 
or not, so too do natural rights theorists 
believe that moral rights persist in the 
absence of recognition.
But Maxwell gives us no argument 
to think that the natural rights theorist 
distinction between 1) the existence of 
a right and 2) the recognition of a right 
is unsound. Rather, we are simply told 
that “Arendt’s critique of the idea of 
rights as natural possession shows the 
idea of rights universalism to be a dan-
gerous myth: a myth that emboldens a 
homogenizing, imperial politics and, in 
so doing, allows us to ignore the reality 
of rightlessness in favour of comforting, 
if illusory, moral certitude.”24 Again, we 
are left wondering just how Arendt’s 
critique really shows rights universalism 
to be a “dangerous myth” which gives 
rise to “imperial politics.” Far from be-
ing a charitable engagement with con-
temporary proponents of natural rights, 
this statement seems to strawman such 
positions by use of such rhetorical flare.
Alastair Hunt, in Chapter 4 of the 
book, claims that “the idea of human 
rights [. . .] repeats the biopolitical logic 
of racism.”25 Hunt writes that there is an 
analogy between human rights and rac-
ism insofar as “both profess that birth in 
a natural group by itself determines an 
individual’s status as a subject of rights.”26 
But this analogy is so broad as to extend 
to anything that human beings are or have 
 22. Id. at 27.
 23. Id. at 49.
 24. Id. at 58.
 25. Id. at 79.
 26. Id. at 80–81.
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in virtue of being human. One could say, 
for instance, that the claim that “human 
beings are rational animals” shares an 
analogy to racism insofar as both purport 
to pick out things that human beings 
have in virtue of being human. But rather 
than human rights being analogous to 
racism, there seems to be a disanalogy. 
For instance, racism—like sexism—is 
contrastive; it attributes a lack of rights 
to some human beings, while attribut-
ing a surplus of rights to other human 
beings. In contrast, human rights blur 
accidental distinctions between human 
beings, and encourage us to see what we 
share in common with one another—our 
humanity.
Nevertheless, building on the faulty 
analogy, Hunt claims that “human rights 
categorically exclude as rights-bearing 
subjects all those who have the bad luck 
of being born into nonhuman species.”27 
But is this true? Is this a fair representation 
of those who advocate for human rights? 
Must they necessarily, as a matter of 
consistency, be committed to the project 
of denying non-human animals rights? 
Hunt seems to make the case for this 
on logical/semantic grounds: “saying all 
human beings ‘are born and remain free 
and equal in rights’ amounts to saying 
only human beings are born this way.”28 
Notice Hunt’s usage of italics, which at-
tempts to equate “all” with “only.” Now 
consider the following statement: “For all 
X, if X is a river then X contains water.” 
Now ask yourself: does it follow from 
the previous sentence that only rivers 
contain water? The answer is: No, of 
course oceans, lakes, streams, and ponds 
all contain water. Upshot: Hunt is wrong 
to claim that the universal character of 
human rights is necessarily exclusionary.
Despite making such insightful re-
marks about Arendt’s phrase at times, 
one cannot help but notice that Hunt’s 
claims—as many other authors’ in the 
volume—fail to meaningfully engage 
with their supposed interlocutors. In 
fact, at times, one gets the feeling that 
the interlocutors are created out of thin 
air; for it is hard to think of anyone writ-
ing about human rights these days who 
claims that saying all human beings “are 
born and remain free and equal in rights” 
amounts to saying, “only human beings 
are born this way.”29 That seems like an 
uncharitable interpretation of someone 
who wants to say that human beings 
have different rights than non-human 
animals—e.g., a right to vote or a right 
to education.
What seems problematic amongst 
most of the aforementioned authors is 
either the claim articulated by natural 
rights theorists that human rights are “self-
evident” or Benhabib’s Kantian-styled 
view. Yet many of the authors in this 
volume take it as self-evident that human 
rights could not possibly be grounded in 
our shared humanity, or dignity, etc. But 
we are left in the dark with respect to why 
we should think this; we are left with a 
muddled collection of bold assertions, 
rather than arguments, which are taken 
to settle the view. In a way, then, we find 
ourselves right back at square one insofar 
as it is assumed to be self-evident that 
natural rights are a non-starter.
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